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The Dark Side of Digital Politics: 
Understanding the Algorithmic 
Manufacturing of Consent and the 
Hindering of Online Dissidence
Emiliano Treré
Abstract Various strands of literature on civic engagement, ‘big data’ and 
open government view digital technologies as the key to easier government 
accountability and citizens’ empowerment, and the solution to many of the 
problems of contemporary democracies. Drawing on a critical analysis of 
contemporary Mexican social and political phenomena, and on a two-year-
long ethnography with the #YoSoy132 networked movement, this article 
demonstrates that digital tools have been successfully deployed by Mexican 
parties and governments in order to manufacture consent, sabotage 
dissidence, threaten activists, and gather personal data without citizens’ 
agreement. These new algorithmic strategies, it is contended, clearly 
show that there is nothing inherently democratic in digital communication 
technologies, and that citizens and activists have to struggle against 
increasingly sophisticated techniques of control and repression that exploit 
the very mechanisms that many consider to be emancipatory technologies.
1 Introduction: coming to terms with techno-optimism within digital 
democratic participation
There is a shared tendency in different strands of  the literature on civic 
engagement, digital activism and protest movements – as well as in 
reflections on the possibilities afforded by open/‘big’ data for increasing 
democratic participation – to view digital technology as the key to 
easier government accountability, and the panacea that can easily solve 
the various issues that plague the worn apparatus of  contemporary 
public institutions. For instance, in recent years the literature on social 
movements and digital media technologies has often reduced diverse 
complex socio-technical configurations and cultural contexts to simple, 
easy-to-understand Twitter or Facebook ‘revolutions’. At the same 
time, the technological developments enabling the publication of  Open 
Data and the tools and capacities to engage with it have been at the 
forefront of  techno-optimism in the transparency and accountability 
field. These developments hold the potential for making vast amounts 
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of  government data – including budget and procurement information 
– widely available to huge numbers of  citizens, who, as the hypothesis 
goes, will then be able to easily analyse and use the data to hold 
governments to account. However, various authors have started to 
unravel the ambiguities, promises and perils of  the open government 
phenomenon (Davies and Bawa 2012; Yu and Robinson 2012).
Meanwhile, the ‘big data’ phenomenon has gained remarkable 
momentum across a wide range of  industries and fields, as well as 
academia. Like many ‘buzzwords’ that have entered the contemporary 
debate, ‘big data’ refers to a plethora of  interconnected social, economic 
and technological phenomena, with reflections about the benefits and 
challenges of  analysing ‘massive quantities of  information produced by 
and about people, things and their interactions’ (Boyd and Crawford 
2012: 1) at their centre. The potential of  large-scale data-gathering 
has been praised for its unprecedented revolutionary possibilities, 
which could include a decisive improvement in the ways citizens and 
governments interact.
Diverse voices have begun to question uncritical views of  these 
phenomena, for example providing more nuanced reflections on the 
pitfalls and threats of  ‘big data’ (Boyd and Crawford 2012; Couldry 
and Powell 2014; Crawford, Gray and Miltner 2014; Tufekci 2014). 
These authors contend that ‘big data’ is not merely a technological 
issue, but first and foremost a ‘mythology’ (Mosco 2014), an emerging 
world view that has to be interrogated, and critically engaged with, not 
incontrovertibly accepted and applauded. Thus, understanding ‘big 
data’ means exploring the consequences of  the computational turn 
across multiple disciplines, and through the alterations it creates in the 
spheres of  epistemology, ontology and ethics. It also means examining 
the limitations, errors and biases in the gathering and interpretation of  
these massive quantities of  information, as well as access to it. In sum, it 
means untangling the processes at the core of  our ‘algorithmic culture’ 
(Hallinan and Striphas 2014).
Other critical voices that tackle the limits, risks and threats of  digital 
communication technologies in relation to democratic processes 
have emerged (Fuchs 2014; Dean 2005). Even so, most accounts of  
experiences and case studies related to the use and appropriation 
of  digital technology in relation to civic engagement still put much 
emphasis on the use of  online platforms to simply ‘fix’ feedback loops, 
allowing citizens to provide feedback on public services, and the 
predominant mood remains optimistic about the potential opportunities 
that technology can offer for citizens to hold governments to account. 
One of  the key lessons of  the Making All Voices Count programme1 
is precisely that the issue of  accountability should be framed as a 
complex political problem, rather than a technical one. But, as has been 
shown in recent studies (Morozov 2013; Treré and Barranquero 2013), 
accountability has often been seen as a matter of  simply ‘finding the 
right technological problem-solving tool’. Furthermore, the controversial 
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question of  obtaining government responsiveness has been usually 
treated in technology studies as a linear and straightforward procedure 
(McGee 2014), rather than as a process that entails dealing strategically 
with power relations that influence which voices will be heard, thus 
constituting a delicate dance between mechanisms that promote citizens’ 
voice and efforts to change government behaviours. However, the voice 
of  citizens does not speak in a vacuum, but rather within the boundaries 
and the limitations of  contemporary neoliberalism, that systematically 
denies and undermines it (Couldry 2010).
Much of  the current focus neglects the ways in which governments can 
and do use digital technology to survey and undermine citizens’ attempts 
to hold them accountable. Instead, something that the recent National 
Security Agency–Snowden scandal made clear is that these technologies 
are used more to spy on us and limit our freedom, than to provide us 
with useful tools to improve the functioning of  democratic institutions.
This article will try to counteract the techno-optimistic bias by providing 
and examining some examples that clearly illustrate the various 
complications emerging from the deployment of  digital technologies by 
governments and parties, and appropriations by citizens and activists. 
The article will draw on a critical analysis of  various contemporary 
Mexican social and political phenomena, and on a two-year-long 
multimodal ethnography that relies on the triangulation of  different 
methodologies: 50 individual interviews with activists of  #YoSoy132; 
four group interviews with protesters from Mexico City, Guadalajara 
and Querétaro; several short periods of  participant observation during 
2012 and 2013; and a qualitative content analysis of  digital media and 
online platforms. Based on the exploration of  the Mexican resistance 
scenario, this article will clearly show that digital platforms can be used 
by government and parties in order to create consent online, control 
and monitor citizens’ activities, and undermine dissent on social media 
platforms. It also shows that the appropriation of  digital communication 
technologies by activists, far from being a linear and unproblematic 
practice, is instead afflicted by everyday frictions, conflicts and struggles.
The article begins by describing the context of  the 2012 Mexican 
elections and the ectivism phenomenon. It goes on to explore the 
algorithmic manufacturing of  consent and undermining of  dissent, 
focusing on the emergence of  the #YoSoy132 movement and the perils 
of  its digital media practices, in particular the so-called ‘Cossío case’. 
Finally, it outlines some broader considerations for the study of  digital 
politics and sketches future scenarios.
2 The 2012 Mexican elections
During the run-up to the 2012 Mexican general elections, the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) – which governed for 70 years, 
prior to the election of  the National Action Party (PAN) in 2000 – led in 
several polls. The PRI candidate was a young and attractive man, whose 
image dominated the media: Enrique Peña Nieto (EPN). As documented 
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by various investigative journalists (Tuckman 2012; Villamil 2010), for 
six years the Mexican media titan Televisa had crafted EPN’s candidacy, 
at the same time as delegitimising his left-wing opponent Manuel López 
Obrador. The Mexican telecracy – the media television duopoly Televisa-
TvAzteca, which controls 99 per cent of  the market (Huerta-Wong 
and Gómez García 2013) – has been described as a ‘wild power’ (Trejo 
Delarbre 2004), capable of  a powerful impact on political decisions. 
Before 2012, Mexican politicians had never considered politics through 
digital technologies to be a priority, relying instead on the powerful 
media propaganda apparatus provided by television as their main 
channel for campaigning (Espino Sánchez 2012).
2.1 The ectivism phenomenon
The 2012 elections witnessed what some saw as an explosion of  digital 
politics, with politicians embracing social media to spread their messages 
and to engage in dialogue with citizens. But they mostly considered online 
spaces as sites for both the premeditated construction of  consensus and the 
artificial, algorithmic construction of  consent, rather than environments for 
reinforcing democracy through dialogue, participation and transparency.
Octavio Islas has framed this behaviour as ‘authoritarian engineering’ 
(Islas 2015: 1), the adoption by Mexican politicians of  dirty online 
strategies which reveal their incapacity and refusal to develop political 
campaigns that can build a trustworthy base of  sympathisers and 
followers in cyberspace, and the very opposite of  citizen participation. 
A video posted on YouTube the day before the second presidential 
debate, The Truth of  Peña Nieto on Twitter,2 revealed the existence of  
organised groups of  so-called PRI ectivistas (‘ectivists’), dedicated to 
tweeting according to the instructions of  EPN’s campaign leaders, and 
trying to counteract, isolate or sabotage criticisms of  PRI from civil 
society actors or other citizens. The film shows a campaign operator 
telling ectivists how to overturn hashtags negative to the campaign.
The ectivist phenomenon is controversial. The network was formed 
in December 2009, and ectivist leaders have always claimed to be 
nothing more than a network of  independent young volunteers and PRI 
supporters.3 But, as the online video shows, and as other researchers have 
demonstrated (Figueiras 2012), the organisation of  an estimated 100,000 
ectivists (Islas 2015) was used systematically during the PRI campaign 
to successfully spread and situate Peña Nieto’s image on digital media 
platforms. In particular, the network was ‘activated’ during periods when 
Peña Nieto’s public image suffered, for instance after his speech at the 
Guadalajara International Book Fair, when he was unable to accurately 
name three books that had influenced his life, and when the #YoSoy132 
movement emerged. In order to counteract embarrassments and 
negative public image, Peña Nieto’s media team intensified the directed 
online activities of  the ectivists. Although one of  Peña Nieto’s campaign 
managers (who later became Secretary of  Education) acknowledged4 
in May 2012 that 20,000 ectivists were tweeting without receiving 
any monetary compensation, many thousands of  others were hired, 
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revealing the possibilities for impacting, distorting and manufacturing 
public opinion within digital environments that institutional parties with 
immense financial resources like the PRI have at their disposal.
2.2 The algorithmic manufacturing of consent
The use of  digital strategies in Mexican electoral politics dates to the 
2011 elections for the Governor of  the State of  Mexico, but the 2012 
general election saw them refined and broadened. Studies of  the social 
media strategies of  Mexican politicians during the 2012 campaign find 
that intensified use of  digital technologies did not correspond to an 
increase in democratic participation or dialogue between candidates and 
voters, but was instead constituted by a massive deployment of  strategies 
including: the creation of  false universes of  followers; the use of  software 
robots (bots)5 to automatically generate tweets; and the hiring of  trolls 
(people who tweet in favour of  a candidate, and against their opponent); 
and ghost followers (empty accounts that boost a candidate’s followers). 
By employing these strategies, candidates discarded the possibility of  
using digital technologies to include voters’ feedback in their decisions, or 
incorporate democratic visions into their ways of  doing politics (Ricaurte 
Quijano 2013). An article on the phenomenon in the MIT Technology 
Review (Orcutt 2012) discusses dangers of  ‘large-scale political 
spamming’, and the need to develop countermeasures to prevent the 
expansion of  this phenomenon to other political scenarios.
3 The algorithmic undermining of dissent
The algorithmic construction of  consent goes hand-in-hand with the 
undermining of  critical voices. As carefully documented by several 
bloggers,6 EPN critics mobilising for the #MarchaAntiEPN (March 
against Peña Nieto) on Twitter were systematically attacked and blocked 
online. As Verkamp and Gupta (2013) demonstrate, dissident voices 
were ‘drowned’ on various occasions by orchestrated bot attacks. Since 
2012, political activists and civil society organisations have denounced 
the dangers of  these attacks, arguing that they criminalise protest and 
segregate dissident voices,7 pointing out the need to act immediately to 
prevent more serious future threats. Unfortunately, political strategies 
that rely on digital technologies to artificially boost consensus have 
been enhanced in the years since the election, up to the point where 
they have become an essential component of  the government’s modus 
operandi, used repeatedly during 2013.8
One case is particularly illuminating, described by philosopher Carlos 
Soto Morfín as a clear example of  techno-authoritarianism.9 A study, 
commissioned by the news programme of  a liberal Mexican journalist 
and carried out by social network and data-mining agency Mesura, 
exposed the massive use of  bots to build an illusion of  online support for a 
controversial energy reform (Aristegui Noticias 2012). Mesura documented 
the systematic deployment of  bots to tweet and re-tweet in support of  the 
reform, discovering that the time gap between the sending of  a supportive 
original message and its re-tweeting was too short to be accomplished by 
a human being. Morfín, one of  the authors of  the study, concludes by 
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warning about the risks to which citizens are exposed in an era when the 
importance of  digital politics is growing day by day, and when those in 
power have no ethical problems with manipulating public perception.
On 26 September 2014, a group of  students departed the Ayotzinapa 
Rural Teachers’ College for a protest in the city of  Iguala, about 130km 
away. They never arrived. Exactly what happened remains unknown, 
but we do know that at least three students were killed and another 43 
remain missing. The Mexican government’s official version is that the 
students were killed after being handed over to the Guerreros Unidos cartel 
on the orders of  the mayor of  Iguala, but investigations conducted 
by the Mexican critical magazine Proceso and the US publication The 
Intercept portrayed a darker picture of  government complacency. After 
the event, several activists and citizens started to protest on social media, 
and the Twitter hashtag #YaMeCanse (I am tired) – which expressed 
the feeling of  not being able to take any more violence or permanent 
insecurity – soon became the core for mobilising and spreading 
information. But journalist Erin Gallagher, who covers protests for 
the online magazine Revolution News10 soon noticed something atypical 
in the search results for the #YaMeCanse hashtags: that they were 
flooded with tweets including the hashtag but no other content apart 
from random punctuation marks. The accounts that were tweeting 
this kind of  empty content were bots: they lacked followers, and were 
tweeting automatically. The noise they created made it difficult for 
citizens to share information using #YaMeCanse, and the hashtag 
consequently dropped out of  Twitter’s trending topics. Mexican blogger 
and data-mining analyst Alberto Escorcia has discovered a reliable way 
of  detecting bot accounts by examining the number of  connections a 
Twitter account has with other users, and has been documenting the use 
of  bots in Mexico to sabotage protests by preventing information from 
spreading, and to send death threats to specific activists. For example, 
since February 2015, anthropologist, activist and blogger Rossana 
Reguillo has received regular death threats on various social media 
platforms.11 Particularly harsh attacks via Twitter lasted more than two 
months, and data-mining analysis of  the Twitter campaign showed that 
bots and trolls were responsible for the majority of  the attacks.
4 Another social media is possible? The #YoSoy132 movement
In the run-up to the 2012 elections, EPN’s path to the presidency 
seemed unstoppable. But on 11 May, something unsettled his image as 
the only available option for Mexico. He arrived at the private, religious 
IberoAmerican University in Mexico City to give a lecture, an event 
that PRI expected to run in an uncomplicated way. However, during the 
candidate’s presentation, several students began to question him about 
police repression and the killings that occurred when he was Governor of  
the State of  Mexico. When EPN justified those violent repressions, tensions 
rose, and he had to leave the university surrounded by a security cordon.
Immediately after the event, PRI politicians described the students as 
violent, intolerant fascist thugs, going so far as to deny that they were 
(Endnotes)
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students. At the same time, the Mexican telecracy and the newspaper 
chain Organización Editorial Mexicana presented versions of  the event 
which portrayed EPN as a hero who had survived a boycott organised 
by the Left. This biased coverage led 131 IberoAmerican students to 
publish a video on YouTube12 in which they displayed their student 
credentials and read their out their names to the camera. This powerful 
act of  reclaimed identity marked the start of  the #YoSoy132 movement, 
when the phrase ‘131 students from Ibero’ quickly became one of  the 
trending topics on Twitter in Mexico, and other students began to join 
the protest, stating ‘I am 132’. This led to the creation of  the hashtag 
that went on to identify the whole movement. While the dirty digital 
strategies of  institutional politics were dominating cyberspace, these 
students proved to the world that digital technologies could be used also 
to spread critical voices, mobilise support, organise protests and foster 
collective identification processes.
5 The digital perils of a networked movement
The celebratory literature that has developed around the #YoSoy132 
movement proclaims the role of  social media in the development of  
a ‘fifth state’ and in the birth of  a ‘Mexican spring’ (Islas and Arribas 
2012), and frames digital technologies as a powerful media alternative 
to the Mexican telecracy (Andión Gamboa 2013). My research depicts 
a different scenario, where everyday frictions and struggles, issues of  
exploitation, dataveillance and control – together with constant attempts 
at delegitimisation – continuously plague protesters’ use of  digital 
technologies. Activists’ social media communications are constantly 
afflicted by clashes, struggles and discord. These divergences come to 
manifest themselves in terms of  daily interactions as activists express 
concern and discomfort with integrating social media into protest 
practices. Issues of  ephemerality and weak ties seep through movement 
interactions by raising questions of  authority and belonging, played out 
in terms of  conflicts over who has access to digital media, and what can 
be posted on social media platforms in the name of  any given protest. 
These are illustrated by the Cossío case, in which a web platform was 
used to infiltrate the movement, gather data on activists and post two 
videos to try to undermine the reputation of  #YoSoy132.
5.1 The Cossío case: web surveillance and video aggressions
In May 2012, a man named Manuel Cossío offered #YoSoy132 activists 
his digital expertise and a fully functional web portal, YoSoy132.mx. 
Only ten days after the emergence of  #YoSoy132, Cossío entered the 
movement through one of  its most prominent student activists, Saúl 
Alvídrez. While Alvídrez and other activists had already acquired the 
YoSoy132.com and the YoSoy132.com.mx domains, it was the YoSoy132.mx 
registered by Cossío that was finally adopted, thanks to Cossío’s rhetorical 
skills in selling the movement his ‘valuable, ready-to-go product’13 during 
various assemblies and meetings. Announced as the official page of  the 
movement by various activists on their Twitter feeds and Facebook pages, 
this professional-looking website, fully integrated with possibilities for 
access and interactions with other platforms like Google and Facebook, 
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was extensively adopted for debate, organisation, content spreading, and 
especially for the archiving of  contributors’ data. But, after a month of  
intense use of  the website, something strange occurred. On 18 June, two 
YouTube videos appeared on the home page of  the #YoSoy132 portal 
and in the YouTube account ‘Yo Soy’.14
In the first video, we see in the background the fixed image of  the face 
of  Saúl Alvídrez, at the same time as we hear his voice and see yellow 
subtitles that report his words. The audio, clearly recorded without his 
consent, appears as a combination of  various of  Alvídrez’ informal 
talks, in which a #YoSoy132 student speaks about the movement and 
relations with Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador (the leader of  the Left), 
and other leftist figures, especially a collective of  directors, investigative 
journalists and other critical intellectuals named ‘México, Ahora o 
Nunca’ (‘Mexico, Now or Never’).
The second video is entitled La Verdad nos Hará Libres (‘Truth Will Set 
us Free’) – a biblical quote, the motto of  the IberoAmerican University, 
which was adopted as one of  the principal slogans of  the movement. 
Manuel Cossío speaks to the camera, reading a text where he expresses 
his profound disappointment on discovering that many leaders of  
the #YoSoy132 movement had been co-opted by left-wing politicians 
affiliated with the Party of  the Democratic Revolution, such as Marcelo 
Ebrard, López Obrador and Alejandro Encinas.
Both of  these online attempts at delegitimisation were the creation 
of  Manuel Cossío Ramos, owner and manager of  the YoSoy132.mx 
website. According to an inquiry carried out by the online investigative 
journalism website Contralínea in June 2013,15 Cossío was an agent of  
the Mexican Secret Service, the Centre of  National Watch and Security, 
whose mission was to infiltrate the movement, steal data through the 
use of  the Web platform, and destabilise the power balances within 
#YoSoy132 before the elections. Activists of  the movement, flooded 
with activities, internal struggles and frictions, and having to deal with 
organisational challenges in the immediate days after the eruption of  
#YoSoy132, trusted Cossío and fell into the government’s ‘digital trap’.
The two videos caused controversy and conflict: Alvídrez had to leave 
the movement and the Mexican telecracy took advantage of  the event 
to insinuate that the videos represented clear proof  that the Mexican 
movement had been manipulated from the beginning by the intellectuals 
of  the Left. #YoSoy132 activists eventually realised that the platform was 
intended as a way to monitor, control and profile them and decided to 
migrate to another platform, yosoy132media.mx. This migration and the 
dangers related to the use of  the other so-called ‘apocryphal web pages’ 
were officially announced on Facebook and spread through multiple 
Twitter accounts in order to inform citizens about the real intentions of  
Cossío and the nature of  the fake portal; other users and supporters from 
the Mexican blogosphere also retweeted the information.
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According to the Contralínea website, the platform was able to steal 
the information of  more than 70,000 citizens with yet unexplored 
consequences for the Mexican resistance. But we still do not have 
clear figures and data on the scope and the results of  this operation of  
sabotage and surveillance by the Mexican government, and we almost 
surely never will. The mechanisms of  this kind of  digital warfare remain 
opaque, secret and very difficult to decode. What this example clearly 
shows is the extent to which political control can use the technological 
platform through which opposition is carried out, stealing data and 
monitoring protest activities, controlling the information flowing 
through the platform, and exploiting it to compromise and destabilise 
the reputation of  the movement. The same digital communication 
technologies that allow engaged citizens to organise, spread alternative 
information, and make the government accountable have been easily 
infiltrated and used against them.
6 Conclusions: the limits and future horizons of data activism
In contrast to celebratory accounts that in various disciplines and 
fields have conceived the increasing use of  digital technologies as a 
way to make governments accountable, and solve most of  the issues 
that plague contemporary political systems, this article, based on an 
exploration of  social and political experiences of  the Mexican context, 
has demonstrated that digital tools have been successfully deployed by 
parties and governments to manufacture consent, sabotage dissidence, 
threaten activists, and gather information without citizens’ consent.
Nowadays, institutions and parties cannot only count on the traditional 
channels of  propaganda, such as the powerful and biased mainstream 
media apparatus, but can also use their vast financial resources in order 
to hire crowds of  sympathisers that can boost their image on digital 
platforms, deploy armies of  bots and trolls that can be activated to 
sabotage dissent and hinder critical voices on social media, and infiltrate 
movements with imposter techies who can use websites to steal sensible 
activists’ data.
Against these powerful strategies, activists have few digital weapons at 
their disposal, above all because they cannot count on huge economic 
resources. However, as we have seen throughout the article, some of  
them have started to use their technological skills in social network 
analysis and data-mining techniques in order to unmask and denounce 
these dirty strategies on various radical media outlets. Perhaps we can 
conceive of  these tactics as ‘counterprotocol practices’ (Galloway and 
Thacker 2007) that use the same advanced technological tools that 
the powerful deploy to control us in order to make their strategies 
visible and accountable. This form of  ‘data activism’ (Milan 2015) can 
empower citizens and activists in their quest for truth and accountability, 
but given the unbalanced distribution of  power, these attempts remain 
feeble and seldom influence public opinion at the international level, or 
the effective counteraction of  such dirty schemes.
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Before singing the praises of  digital communication technologies to 
make democratic institutions more accountable and reliable, we should 
recognise, understand and try to overcome the plethora of  dangers 
and risks that are associated with them in the arena of  digital politics. 
The algorithmic construction of  consent and the artificial sabotage 
of  dissent demonstrate that there is nothing inherently democratic in 
digital technologies. In order to guarantee that a plurality of  critical 
voices is represented and can be heard, citizens have to struggle against 
increasingly sophisticated techniques of  control and repression that 
successfully exploit the very mechanisms that many consider to be 
emancipatory technologies.
Notes
1 Making All Voices Count is supported by DFID, USAID, Sida and 
the Omidyar Network.
2 www.youtube.com/watch?v=mcy5uT4TygA.
3 http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2012/05/18/quienes-son-los-
ectivistas-y-por-que-apoyan-a-pena-nieto.
4 www.sinembargo.mx/09-05-2012/228938.
5 A ‘social bot’ refers to a ‘computer algorithm that automatically 
produces content and interacts with humans on social media, trying 
to emulate and possibly alter their behaviour’ (Ferrara et al. 2015: 
1–2). Some are benign, but many are designed for the purpose of  
harmfully manipulating social media discourse, for instance by 
artificially inflating the support of  a candidate during the elections.
6 In Spanish, www.animalpolitico.com/blogueros-blog-
invitado/2011/11/23/haz-patria-caza-un-bot/#axzz2pexR2Ru3; 
in English: http://thisisfusion.tumblr.com/post/22718557022/
twittergate-mexico-pri-twitter-scandal.
7 www.sinembargo.mx/opinion/07-01-2014/20465.
8 See the following websites for a detailed list of  cases where bots  
were systematically deployed in the Mexican context in the last few  
years: www.sinembargo.mx/opinion/07-01-2014/20465;  
http://loquesigue.tv/.
9 The expression techno-authoritarianism has been adopted in other 
contexts to refer broadly to uses of  digital technologies that reinforce 
hierarchies, and leadership while pretending to enhance participatory 
democracy (Treré and Barassi 2015).
10 http://revolution-news.com/.
11 http://revolution-news.com/mexico-bot-campaign-of-death-threats-
against-blogger-rossana-reguillo/.
12 See www.youtube.com/watch?v=P7XbocXsFkI.
13 Research interview with Laura, 11 April 2013.
14 www.youtube.com/watch?v=nj2HipB5a1c&list=UUg-
S9Qre98WT9kDEb4hixKw and www.youtube.com/
watch?v=UmuFHcyHSaA.
15 http://contralinea.info/archivo-revista/index.php/2013/09/08/
yosoy-infiltrado/. These findings were anticipated by articles on the 
critical blog SinEmbargo and by the magazine Proceso, and further 
analysed on the Revolución 3.0 blog.
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